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ABSTRACT

A manufacturer leases rail cars to transport raw material from the supplier to the factory.
The manufacturer must balance the costs of leasing rail cars versus stockouts (leading to
plant closings) and inventory carrying costs. Using a model of circular queues and a
simulation, the cost implications of leasing different numbers of rail cars are analyzed. It is
concluded that stockout costs exceed the cost of excess inventory and capacity in the logistics
system.

INTRODUCTION
Transporting raw materials to a production
facility would seem to be almost trivial when the
final product requires only one primary raw
material. While the process is not as involved as
a multi-level bill of materials system, there are
still a number of variables with which one must
deal, particularly in the logistics system. In this
case, the raw material, peanuts, are transported
from a sheller near Columbus, Georgia, to
Portsmouth, Virginia, to be converted into
peanut butter. The transportation is via
railroad—a distance of about 700 miles. The
manufacturer is currently required to lease rail
cars, which are then moved from Georgia to
Virginia full of raw, shelled peanuts, and
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returned to Georgia empty. The question the
plant manager faces on a regular basis is how
many rail cars to lease?
Analytically, the system faced by the plant
manager is a circular queueing system. As
explained in Appendix A, this is a special case of
a Jackson network (see Figure 1). In the usual
queueing process, customers enter the system,
are served and leave the system. In our case, the
rail cars leased by the company moved in a
continuous loop. The rail cars are “served”’ in
Georgia when they were loaded with peanuts, in
Virginia when they are unloaded at the plant
and en route in both directions. Appendix A
describes briefly the analytical construction of
the problem.

THE PROBLEM
FIGURE 1
THE CIRCULAR QUEUE

There are numerous examples in the literature
of analytic solutions to rail car scheduling
(Cordeau, Soumis, and Derosiers, 2000; Luiibbecke and Zimmermann, 2003; and Sherali and
Maguire, 2000). Although the objective here was
to solve for the optimal number of rail cars, an
analytical solution was not a practical option for
several reasons. The first is the limitation of
Jackson networks for predictive purposes (see
Appendix A); the second is the nature of the
data. The probability distributions of service
times were empirical distributions. Using
theoretical distributions would have made the
problem computationally more attractive, but
less realistic. Third, the company did not want to
release cost figures. Therefore, results could only
be stated as trade-offs in terms of numbers of
rail cars and number of days the plant would be
shut down. Given the results, however, the
company could easily calculate the corresponding
total costs. Finally, the company wanted the
flexibility to test easily a variety of scenarios. For
these reasons, it was decided to use simulation
as the method of dealing with the problem. It
was also easier to explain the process and results
to the plant manager. Further, the plant
manager could watch the outcomes develop as
the simulation was running and could run the
simulation with various scenarios.

The peanut butter manufacturer in Virginia (VA)
required an average of 180,000 pounds of
peanuts per day to keep the line running. Rail
cars carrying 190,000 pounds of peanuts each
supplied the plant. The rail cars queued up at
the plant waiting to be unloaded. Any time the
queue was empty, the plant had to be shut down
at a corresponding substantial cost. If there were
too many rail cars in the queue, it could cause a
problem, especially in the summer. Peanuts are
a live organic product and could spoil if left
sitting in the sun too long. Although the com
pany could provide no specific data for this
problem, management asked that the solution
tell them the length of the queue at the plant
and the mean number of days in the queue.
The peanuts are purchased from a sheller in
Georgia (GA). The sheller buys raw peanuts from
the farmers, shells them, and loads them in the
hopper cars. Since the sheller maintains an
inventory of peanuts, there is virtually no queue
at the sheller except on weekends. A rail car
arriving at the sheller is loaded and sent on its
way. The plant in VA operates seven days per
week; the sheller in GA operates five days per
week. In other words, during the five days per
week the sheller is operating, it is assumed that
the queue time is zero. On the weekends, the
queue time is one or two days, depending upon
whether the rail car arrives on Sunday or
Saturday. Except for the weekends, the company
had no record of the sheller ever being a cause of
delay.
The travel time between the sheller and the
plant (and the return trip) varied widely. The
rail cars were sent from the sheller to a rail yard,
where they waited until a northbound train was
formed. When they reached Virginia, they were
once again taken to a rail yard, where the train
was broken down. The peanut cars then had to
wait for a switching locomotive to take them to
the plant. It was assumed that the rail cars
arrived at the destination server in the same
order in which they left the source server. In
other words, no passing was allowed. The travel
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times both ways varied according to the
following empirical probability distribution, with
the average (mean) time in both directions equal
to 7.9 days (see Table 1). Since a simulation was
used instead of an analytical solution, there was
no need to attempt to fit the data to a theoretical
probability distribution.
The rate of consumption of the peanuts at the
plant depended upon the availability of
machines, workers, other raw materials as well
as the master schedule provided by company
headquarters. The output of the plant was
measured in cases of peanut butter. Each case
required eighteen pounds of peanuts. The
consumption of peanuts and production of
peanut butter varied randomly according to an
empirical probability distribution with mean
consumption equal to 181,260 pounds (see Table
2).
Since the plant manager thought in terms of
cases produced, this is how production is entered
into the simulation program. It is a simple
matter to convert from cases produced to total
pounds—the unit of measure for shipping the
peanuts. The third column represents the
method of eliciting probability estimates from
the plant manager. The manager was asked to
state the number of days that the plant would
most likely have the associated production level
in any given two week period. This information
was verified from plant production records. The
second and fourth columns are those actually
used by the simulation.
TABLE 1
RAIL TRAVEL
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
Days
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
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Probability
0.01
0.18
0.27
0.25
0.13
0.09
0.03
0.04
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TABLE 2
PEANUT CONSUMPTION
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
Average
Cases

Production
Pounds

0

Days per
14 Days

Probability

0

0.0

0.0

1,000

18.000

0.0

0.0

2,000

36,000

0.14

0.01

3,000

54,000

0.28

0.02

4,000

72,000

0.28

0.02

5,000

90.000

0.42

0.03

6,000

108,000

0.56

0.04

7,000

126,000

0.84

0.06

8,000

144,000

0.98

0 07

9,000

162,000

1.40

0.10

10,000

180,000

1.96

0.14

11,000

198,000

2.24

0.16

12.000

216,000

2.10

0.15

13,000

234,000

1.82

0.13

14,000

252,000

0.84

0.06

15,000

270,000

0.14

0 01

THE SIMULATION
At the time this research was conducted, the
company was using twenty-five rail cars.
Although the plant manager was satisfied with
25 cars from the point of view of keeping the
factory operating, it was of interest to know if it
would be economical to reduce the number of
cars. In consultation with the plant manager, it
was decided to run simulations for ten through
twenty-six rail cars. This would yield seventeen
data points for plotting the graphs. The company
could then calculate the trade-offs. For each
number of rail cars, a sample of size 30 was
generated. Each of the 30 items in each sample

was generated by a simulation of 2000 days—
slightly over five years.
Both Banks and Carson (1984) and Thesen and
Travis (1992) emphasize the importance of
minimizing initial bias. Banks and Carson (1984)
state that there is no analytical method for doing
so, but suggest setting the initial conditions as
close to reality as possible. To this end, the rail
cars were evenly distributed at the plant and the
sheller. The plant had sufficient inventory of
peanuts to avoid running out before new
shipments arrived, and new shipments could be
made from Georgia without the initial wait for
empty cars. The initial conditions slightly
increased the queue sizes at the two locations,
but over 2000 days, the effect would be minimal.
Since the system stabilizes so quickly, there was
no need to distribute cars en route.
The simulation was written in third generation
software of a specific simulation software. This
choice was made to provide flexibility for the
plant manager, and to provide easy portability of
the software to workstations at the plant. Each
run generated a number of statistics including
the following data: (See Figure 2).
•
•
•

Average length of each queue
Mean number of days in each queue
Number of days the plant was shut down for
lack of raw materials

FIGURE 2
DISPLAY OF ONE SIMULATION RUN

THE RESULTS
As already stated, the actual system was being
operated with twenty-five rail cars at the
beginning of the study. This was the “way they
had always done it,” but the new plant manager
wanted to challenge that assumption. The
results from the simulation with 25 cars were
used to validate the system (Fishman, 1973). The
days out, queue length in Virginia, and average
time in the queue in Virginia were consistent
with actual observations at the plant and with
data provided by the plant manager for the
twenty-five car case.
Figure 3 shows the average number of days out
of 2000 the plant would be shut down for each
number of rail cars in the system. It varies from
772 (38.6 percent of the days) for ten rail cars to
0.4 (rounded to zero on the graph) for twenty-six.
The 95 percent confidence interval ranges from
±28.59 for the average 772 days with ten rail
cars to ±2.21 for the average 0.4 with 26 rail
cars. Decreasing the number of days the plant
must close has a cost, however. Although the
actual cost of leasing rail cars was not known,
the queue at VA serves as a surrogate. This is
because as long as the cars are moving, they are
being productive. When they are in the queue at
the plant, they and their contents are in
inventory and are thus simply adding to carrying
costs.
As shown in Figure 4, the average number of
cars in the VA queue (at the plant) ranges from
1.31 when ten cars are in the system to 9.11
wrhen 26 cars are in the system. In percentage
terms, the queue ranges from 13.1 percent of the
ten rail cars in the system to 35 percent of the 26
cars in the system. While the number of cars in
the system went up by 260 percent, the average
number of cars in the queue went up by 595
percent. In other words, the increase in the cost
of holding inventory at the plant has been more
than twice as much as the cost of leasing rail
cars. These two costs together must be traded off
against the cost of closing the plant for lack of
materials.
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FIGURE 3
CARS VS. DAYS OUT

As shown in Figure 6, the average time on the
GA-VA rail route (or queue), for example,
increases slightly as the number of cars in the
system increases. This is caused by the rule that
cars may not pass each other. Otherwise, the
average time would remain the same for all
cases. In similar fashion, under the fill rule at
Georgia (fill a car as soon as it arrives), the
average queue length there increases slightly
from 0.2 to 0.4 cars as the number of cars in the
system increases from 10 to 26. This is because
the supplier works only five days per week; so,
with more cars in the system, the weekend
queue becomes longer.

FIGURE 5
DAYS IN VA QUEUE
FIGURE 4
LENGTH OF VA QUEUE

FIGURE 6
DAYS IN GA-VA QUEUE

The average time spent in the VA queue shows
similar results. As shown in Figure 5, the
average number of days per rail car spent in the
VA queue ranges from 2.65 days for 10 cars to
9.63 days for 26 cars. Since the GA queue and
the transit times are relatively constant no
matter how many cars are in the system, the
average rail car spends approximately thirteen
percent of its time in the VA queue when ten
cars are in the system and approximately thirtyfour percent when 26 cars are in the system. The
average time spent en route is the same in both
directions since they are driven by identical
probability distributions.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Without actual cost figures, it appears that
twenty-five or twenty-six is, in fact, the best
number of cars to lease. More than twenty-six
would be unnecessary since the plant would
almost never shut dow n with twenty-six in use.
To make a decision, the company should inject
actual costs into the calculations and make the
trade-offs. Management must be careful to
include all the relevant costs. The cost of the rail
cars must include not only the cost of leasing
that number of cars, but must also include the
cost of holding the additional peanut inventory
in the queue at the plant.
To gain insight into what the decisions should
be, the authors independently contacted a rail
car leasing company. Hopper cars of the type
used by the peanut butter manufacturer would
cost $325 per month on a five-year lease or $340
per month on a three-year lease. This includes
maintenance, a liner to keep the peanuts clean,
and a hatch to allow unloading from the top of
the hopper car. Each car would cost, assuming a
five-year lease, $3900 per year to lease. Twentyfive cars would cost $97,500 per year. Since
twenty-five cars is a relatively small number for
the leasing company, there are no price breaks
for a problem of this magnitude. In the simula
tion results, the annual cost of the rail cars
would range from $39,000 for ten cars to
$101,400 for twenty-six cars. These data are
representative of what the manufacturer may
have paid, and are not their actual costs. But,
since the cost of shutting down and restarting a
continuous process factory is high no matter
what the product, and marginal cost of the extra
rail car is so small ($3900), and given the
constraints of transporting the peanuts via rail,
there is no reasonable scenario under which the
plant manager should reduce the number of rail
cars.
Another area where the plant manager could cut
costs is in the peanut inventory carried in the
queue at the Portsmouth plant. The number of
rail cars in the queue and their average stay are
both around 8.5. Since each rail car holds

190,000 pounds, and the spot price of raw
peanuts is about $390.00 per ton, each car holds
about $37,050 worth of peanuts. Using the
generally accepted U.S. average inventory
carrying cost of 35 percent of the cost of the
peanuts per year, it would cost approximately
$302 to carry the inventory in each rail car for
the 8.5 days. Since the firm uses about 300 rail
cars full of peanuts per year, the inventory
holding cost amounts to about $90,595 per year.
Relative to the annual turnover for the plant,
this is a very small amount. Even if the holding
cost were tripled to 100 percent, it would be a
relatively small amount. In addition, given the
variability in transit times via rail, reducing the
queue at the Portsmouth plant would also
increase the probability of a plant shut down for
lack of material. The marginal cost of carrying
the extra inventory is not large enough to justify
taking this additional risk.
RESEARCH EXTENSIONS
The simulation opened additional doors for
research. The company could, for example,
switch from rail cars to trucks. This, in fact, was
proposed to the company by a trucking firm.
Although trucks carry a much smaller load
(44,000 pounds), they make the trip much faster
and with less variation since they travel directly
from the sheller to the plant without going
through the switching yards. The trucking
company claimed they could supply the plant
with ten trucks. The plant manager did not want
to consider this option since the unloading
facility was designed specifically for rail cars,
and switching to trucks would have required a
considerable capital investment. The simulation
model was used to test the claim of the trucking
company and it was found that ten trucks did,
indeed, yield about the same results as twentyfive rail cars.
Also proposed was using a rail-truck combina
tion to use trucks as a back-up to avoid running
out of material. Several factors caused this
option to be rejected. One is that the rail transit
times are entirely under control of the railroad,
and the variation is caused by delays in the
Spring 2006
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switching yard. Getting information about
arrival times would be difficult to impossible
within a time frame in which one could mobilize
truck transportation unless one kept one or two
trucks on stand-by. Keeping trucks on stand-by
would be more expensive than simply adding
additional rail cars to the system.
Another option would have been to allow
different decision rules for loading cars at the
Georgia facility. A queue could be allowed to
form in Georgia and a rail car filled and released
only when a rail car is emptied in Virginia (a
type of kanban approach); or a maximum could
be set on the number of rail cars filled and
released per day in Georgia. This would keep the
queue at the plant from getting too long.
Although the queue at the sheller would grow in
length (when the rail cars were empty), these
rules would decrease the length of the VA queue
and thus decrease the costs of holding peanut
inventory and spoilage. As was shown pre
viously, however, the potential gains from
decreasing the Portsmouth queue length are
minimal or even possibly negative. In addition,
the process would be under the control of the
sheller, which means there would be no
guarantee that the rail cars would be loaded
when the factory needed them. There also would
be a cost to coordinating and communicating
with the sheller and a cost of allowing empty rail
cars to stay at their facility.
For a given number of rail cars, the probability
distribution of travel times could be varied to see
if there would be an advantage to negotiate more
stable travel times with the railroad. Unfort

unately, that did not seem to be even a remote
possibility.
A random production rate was assumed for all
simulations. This was reasonable given the plant
operation at the time, but it may be possible to
vary the production rate according to a plan and
thus to adapt to the length of the queue at the
plant. This was considered unlikely by the plant
manager since that degree of control over the
production rate would have required a major
process improvement effort at the plant.
CONCLUSION
As stated at the beginning of the article, the
typical queueing system consists of a stream of
customers entering the system at either a constant
or random rate. They are directed to one or more
servers where the service rate is, again, either
constant or random. The customers then leave the
system. The literature for both theory and
applications in these typical systems is quite rich.
Circular queues, however, present a different
scenario. Customers stay in the system and
proceed from server to server infinitely. The
literature on circular queues is fairly sparse,
although applications in the “real world” are
common in logistics systems including scheduled
ocean transportation. It was shown that a
relatively intractable problem theoretically can be
solved using simulation. Although the solution is
not optimal, as simulation results never are, it
provides clear guidance to the decision maker. The
results of this research demonstrate that
simulation is a viable tool for dealing with circular
queueing logistics problems.
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APPENDIX A
Queueing systems typically have one or more
servers serving a stream of customers who enter
an open system from the outside, are served, and
then leave the system. The primary problem is to
determine, given the appropriate cost and/or
value functions, the number of servers one must
have to process the customers in an optimal
manner. Circular queueing systems, on the other
hand, are closed network systems. They are a
special case of Jackson systems (Ozekici, 1990).
The system has a fixed number of customers w'ho
are served consecutively by two or more servers
in an endless loop. The primary problem in this
case is to determine the number of customers
required to minimize the cost of server idle time
plus the cost of the customers. Circular queues
are relatively difficult to deal with analytically.
In an early work, Cox and Smith (1961), for
example, devote only three pages to the topic,
and then only under constraining assumptions.
Gelenbe, Pujolle, and Nelson (1987), give a more
detailed analysis in their chapter on Jackson
networks. The limitation of Jackson networks in
this case is that they are robust in describing a
system, but limited in predicting a system
(Lipsky, 1992).
In the present case, the circular queue consists
of four servers. Server one is a peanut butter
manufacturer in Virginia. Server three is the
vendor—the peanut sheller in Georgia. Servers
two and four are railroads transporting the
loaded rail cars from Georgia to Virginia and the
empty cars back again. The peanuts are

processed (shelled) in Georgia and then shipped
to Virginia via rail car to be manufactured into
peanut butter. Since they are moving through
the system and being served, the customers are
the rail cars. They were served (loaded) in
Georgia, travel to Virginia full, served (unloaded)
in Virginia, and returned to Georgia empty. The
manufacturer in Virginia lease the rail cars. The
problem is to determine the optimal number of
rail cars to lease.
If the vector k = (klt k2, k3, kj represents the
number of customers (rail cars) at each of the N
(N = 4) servers, then

k=y

k,

- total rail cars in the system

The matrix of transition probabilities is as
follows:

0100
0010

"

, where py is the probability of a

0001 customer moving from serving
1000 station i to serving station j.
The matrix P reflects the circular nature of the
Jackson network. Given that a customer (rail
car) is at a particular serving station, the next
station to which it moves is deterministic; i.e., it
moves there with probability 1. Since customers
are not allowed to enter or leave the system, the
system is closed.
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The system may be diagrammed as in Figure Al:
kt

ptJ

= probability of a customer going from
station i to station j.

|i,

= mean service time at server station i.

= number of customers in queue i including

the customer being served.

FIGURE Al

This is intended to be an overview of the theory and not a comprehensive view of the literature.
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